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Abstract: Social accounts of objective content, like the one advanced by 
 Tomasello (2014), are traditionally challenged by an ‘essential tension’ (Hutto 
and Satne 2015). The tension is the following: while sociality is deemed to be at 
the basis of thinking, in order to explain sociality, some form of thinking seems 
to be necessarily presupposed. In this contribution I analyse Tomasello’s two-
step theory of the evolution of human thinking vis-à-vis this challenge. While 
his theory is in principle suited to address it, I claim that the specifics of the first 
step and the notion of perspective that infuse it are problematic in this regard. I 
end by briefly sketching an alternative.
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1  Introduction
How is it possible for something such as contentful states of mind to exist in a natural 
world? How can thoughts be objective, i.e. how can they refer to things beyond 
 themselves? How did the capacity to think objectively emerge in natural history?
Any proposed naturalistic explanations of objective content must (i) not pre-
suppose objective content and (ii) have recognized scientific credentials.
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The attempts to provide an answer to this puzzle can be schematically classi-
fied along three different types of theory. I follow Haugeland’s lead1 in branding 
these three main types as neo-Cartesian, neo-Behaviourist and neo-Pragmatism. 
Neo-Cartesians are committed to the idea that mental contents are original to the 
individual mind and prior to the existence of socio-cultural practices. Among 
proponents of such a view are Fodor and Millikan. Neo-Behaviourism is defined 
by its cautious attitude towards assuming the existence of mental states; contra-
riwise, it renders content in terms of intentional ascriptions. Daniel Dennett is 
famously an advocator of such a position. Finally, neo-Pragmatism take social 
practices to be at the basis of the emergence of content. They claim that “content-
ful tokens, [e.g. mental contents], like ritual objects, customary performances, 
and tools, occupy determinate niches within the social fabric – and these niches 
‘define’ them as what they are. Only in virtue of such culturally instituted roles 
can tokens have contents at all” (Haugeland 1990, p. 404).
Tomasello’s work on the phylogenesis and ontogeny of human thinking lines 
up with the third group. He explicitly advocates this view from the very beginning 
of his A Natural History of Human Thinking: “[Thinking] is a solitary activity all 
right, but on an instrument made by others for that general purpose, after years 
of playing with and learning from other practitioners […]. Human thinking is 
individual improvisation enmeshed in a socialcultural matrix” (p. 1). Thus, it will 
come as no surprise that his philosophical companions are, among others, Witt-
genstein, Brandom, Hegel, Vygotsky, Piaget and Davidson, all of whom comfort-
ably side with the aforementioned social constructivist, neo-Pragmatism view.
The main idea that Tomasello has been developing over the years is that a dis-
tinctive tendency to cooperate, coupled with an ability for socio-cultural learning 
that is supported by environmental scaffolds, played a critical role in enabling 
contentful forms of cognition to emerge (Tomasello 1999).2
Over the years, many have raised suspicions as to the prospects of such a 
social strategy for success.3 The social constructivist strategy is thought to embed 
an essential tension (Hutto and Satne 2015). The problem at issue can be easily 
seen if we make explicit the line of reasoning that seems to underlie most attempts 
to account for the origins of content in social terms:
1 See Haugeland 1990. For a much more detailed treatment of the problem of content see Hutto 
and Satne 2015.
2 Tomasello gives reasons for believing “that the amazing suite of cognitive skills and products 
displayed by modern humans is the result of some sort of species-unique mode or modes of cul-
tural transmission. The evidence [for this] […] is overwhelming” (Tomasello 1999, p. 4). 
3 See for example Fodor and Pylyshyn 2015, p. 14. Their particular version of the challenge hangs 
on the claim -characteristic of some neo-Pragmatism theories- that objective content depends on 
language. As I explain below, the problem has a more general scope.
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1. Contentful intentionality (i.e. objective thinking) develops through social 
cooperation and engagement in socio-cultural practices;
2. Participating in and mastering socio-cultural practices requires intelligence;
3. Intelligence requires intentionality;
4. Intentionality requires content (i.e. objective thinking).
If intentionality depends on social practices, how could we ever participate in 
social practices in the first place, since doing so requires a set of sophisticated 
capacities (e.g. learning capacities, the capacity to identify objects and situations, 
etc.) that uncontroversially presuppose the mastery of such intentional capaci-
ties? Unless a satisfactory answer could be provided to this essential tension, the 
social constructivist strategy is doomed.
Tomasello’s new book may provide the cure for this neo-Pragmatism problem. 
It would lie in the distinction between two kinds of intentionality, namely, joint 
intentionality and collective intentionality. This strategy has the advantage of, 
on the one hand, acknowledging that only those with minds can harbor states 
with the right contents for engaging in practices of learning from others (besides 
language-learning practices, which are key for objective thinking, strategies for 
foraging, hunting, and so on should also be included here), while at the same 
time providing a social constructivist, neo-Pragmatism account of the emergence 
of objective content in the natural world: the specific ability that allowed humans 
to entertain objective thoughts has a natural history, one in which social forms of 
engagement and cooperation played an essential role.
The notion of joint intentionality promises to describe the set of abilities that 
a creature is able to entertain without yet being capable of manipulating truth-
functional representations of others and the world. At the same time, these cog-
nitive tools would provide the platform for the development of the latter kind 
of representational capacities that belong together with collective intentionality. 
This strategy seems to have all the ingredients to overcome the essential tension 
outlined above: it provides fresh tools for neo-Pragmatism to use in explaining 
how organisms progressed from more primitive forms of intentionality to objec-
tive forms of intentionality. Elaborating a little, what the neo-Pragmatism story 
lacks is an account of how social practices are possible without having concepts 
about the other’s beliefs, desires, intentions. Tomasello’s account of the emer-
gence of objective content avoids this essential tension by placing objective 
intentionality only in the context of special sorts of socio-cultural norms and 
acknowledging a different form of intentionality that explains social engagement 
in practices that lead to its development. It also assumes that our species-wide 
biologically based tendencies constitute the platform through which objective 
content first arises on the scene. This is to take for granted that biological forces 
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4 According to Tomasello, we should in fact distinguish three steps in the evolution of human 
thinking: 1. individual intentionality, characteristic of great apes’ capacity for thinking; 2. joint 
intentionality, characteristic of early humans’ – a hypothesized intermediate species – thinking; 
and 3. collective intentionality, characteristic of modern human thinking.
put in place mechanisms for social cooperation that enable individual learning 
and work in conjunction with mechanisms for the social inheritance of culturally 
evolved devices.
While I surmise that this strategy is a promising contribution to the debate 
about the natural origins of contentful thinking, in what follows I would like to 
raise some important concerns about the specific way in which Tomasello devel-
ops it in his recent book. In the next section, I briefly describe the distinction 
between joint intentionality and collective intentionality that Tomasello deploys. 
After that, I explain why some of the features characteristic of the former kind of 
intentionality can raise problems for his view. To conclude I succinctly propose 
an alternative that, while consistent with Tomasello’s general strategy, steers 
clear of those concerns.
2  Joint Intentionality and Collective Intentionality
A Natural History of Human Thinking is the result of the research that Tomasello 
and others have been conducting for the last decade or so and argues that two 
forms of shared intentionality are necessary to account for both the ontogeny and 
the phylogeny of human thinking (p. 31).4 Those two forms are the following:
1. Joint intentionality. This involves small-scale collaboration and joint atten-
tion, and it is at play in short-lived spatially and temporally located second- 
personal relations between particular individuals (p. 48). Some understanding 
of different perspectives arises as the individuals relate and become aware of 
the fact that they are both attending to the same thing (p. 45). Individuals 
may come across a different perspective that they could contrast with their 
own. But even if there are several perspectives in play at this stage, this does 
not yet amount to real objectivity in the sense of universal validity.
2. Collective intentionality. This involves large-scale forms of collaboration that 
go beyond the here and now and entail the construction of a common cultural 
ground as well as the creation of conventions and institutions (p. 5–6). At this 
point individuals become group-directed or group-minded, which allows for 
a new level of generality. Individuals can now assume a view from nowhere, a 
“group’s agent-neutral point of view” (p. 5; see also p. 122).
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Some remarks on the nature of this distinction are in order. First, Tomasello 
focuses on intentional action, as most of the literature on collective intentionality 
does (Bratman 1992; Knoblich et al. 2011; Butterfill 2012). Accordingly, Tomasello 
claims that the first form of cooperative activity – the one characteristic of joint 
intentionality – can be captured as a kind of shared intentional action. More spe-
cifically he claims that this primitive form can be captured by Bratman’s analysis 
of joint action (38 ff.). In doing so he distinguishes three conditions that need to 
be fulfilled in order to engage in joint intentional action of that kind:
If you and I are agents, and J is a goal, then:
(1) I must have the goal of doing J together with you,
(2) you must have the goal of doing J together with me, and
(3) we must have common knowledge, or common ground, that we both know 
each other’s goal (p. 38).
Condition (3) involves meta-representations of other people’s mental states, 
which in turn involve higher order attitudes: I know that you know, and you know 
that I know, and you know that I know that you know, etc. While acknowledging 
that common ground might replace the need for this recursive mindreading in the 
case of humans, for whom the knowledge that we both want to J might suffice, 
Tomasello claims that in conflicting situations we draw back to a recursive rea-
soning, thus showing that there is indeed “an underlying recursive structure” 
(p.  38; also 2008). Accordingly, and expanding on the cognitive structure that 
allows for engagement in joint action, he underlines the need for recursive infer-
ences, simulations and ongoing self-monitoring and meta-representations (p. 5, 
9, 143). Understanding the other’s perspective requires, so he claims, simulat-
ing my partner’s abductive inferences ahead of time in order to anticipate how I 
might be understood by him (p. 94).5 In sum, Tomasello grants an essential role 
to social cognition as part and parcel of joint intentionality and endorses a model 
that integrates elements from both simulation theory (ST) and theory-theory of 
mind (TT).
Second, Tomasello links the distinction between joint and collective 
 intentionality to issues of validity and objectivity. As said, in the case of joint 
intentionality, when two people are aware that they are both attending to the same 
thing simultaneously, an understanding of different perspectives might arise. 
The individual may discover a different perspective that she could contrast with 
her own. However, although we can already have several perspectives in play at 
5 More specifically, Tomasello lists the following three key components: cognitive representa-
tions (perspectival and symbolic), inferences (socially recursive) and self-monitoring (regulating 
one’s perspective from the perspective of a cooperative partner) (p. 33).
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this stage – when dealing with small-scale I-thou relations – we are still far from 
having attained real objectivity in the sense of universal validity. A  significant 
further step takes place the moment individuals become group-minded. This 
allows for scalability through group identification: we-groups make it possible to 
integrate ancestors and descendants, thus furnishing large groups with history 
and traditions. In natural history, this process of group-identification allows for a 
new level of generality. It is not simply a question of adding more perspectives to 
the two already in play, but of moving to the level of any perspective  whatsoever, 
i.e. to a view from everywhere (and nowhere) (p. 122). Tomasello introduces a 
 corresponding distinction between second-person and group-level normative 
pressure. In the former case, I am sensitive to how another individual evaluates 
me and might regulate my actions accordingly. In the latter case, a more objective 
or agent-neutral standard is in play. Even if a particular individual enforces the 
group’s norm, she is so to speak doing so as an emissary of the group as a whole 
(p. 88).
Finally, Tomasello rejects the idea that language is the foundation of human 
cognition and claims that language can only come into the picture once an 
already existing social infrastructure is at work (p. 128).
A Natural History of Human Thinking must then be recognized for enrich-
ing the field by distinguishing two forms of social intentionality and doing so in 
terms of a two-step evolutionary story of the emergence of objective content. In 
doing so he has outstripped many of the current approaches to collective inten-
tionality that are committed to a uniformity thesis, i.e. to the idea that there is a 
single notion of intentionality that could capture any form of sharedness.6 Prima 
facie, this seems to satisfy what is needed to overcome the essential tension, and 
pave the way for a successful social constructivist account of objective content. 
Nevertheless, the specifics of this strategy might raise doubts about its prospects 
for succeeding in such a task. I turn to such doubts in the following section.
3   Joint Intentionality as a Primitive Kind of Social 
Intentionality
The introduction of joint intentionality seemed to avoid the need for objective 
representations, thus overcoming the essential tension at stake in many social 
6 Cf. Zahavi and Satne 2015, where we coin the term and defend a pluralist view against 
such uniformity thesis. For empirical evidence supporting a pluralist view see also Salice and 
 Henriksen 2015.
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accounts of objective content by acknowledging a form of intentionality that 
could be at the basis of sociality without presupposing the mastery of socio- 
cultural practices. But the problem poses itself again once it is assumed that, in 
order to engage in joint intentionality, one needs to already entertain meta-rep-
resentations of other people’s mental states (those needed by Bratman’s analysis 
of jointness), perspective-taking on external states of affairs and the capacity for 
their inter-assessment. The question arises as to how one could have states such 
that they would suffice to portray someone else’s perspective on the same situa-
tion, while at the same time falling short of what joint intentionality engagements 
are supposed to make possible, namely, thinking with objective content.7 This 
opens the question as to whether a non-objective kind of thinking that encom-
passes perspective differences is at all possible, and what the notion of content 
associated with it would really mean.8
To be fair, Tomasello has defended the possibility of pre-objective thought 
extensively by describing a set of proto-thinking capacities in chimpanzees 
(Tomasello 1999, ch. 2). But even granting that we could make sense of chimps’ 
proto-thinking capacities in terms of the specific abilities they have, that kind of 
content cannot be equated with the sort associated with meta-representations – 
including Bratman’s recursive kind – and simulation, which is the kind of content 
at stake in explaining the possibility of joint intentionality. This latter kind is in 
fact more complex, according to Tomasello himself, since it involves second and 
third order attitudes that chimps are unable to entertain. In order to account for 
the intermediate content needed to make sense of joint intentionality, he hypoth-
esizes the existence of a set of cognitive mechanisms such as perspectival repre-
sentations and social self-monitoring (Tomasello 2014, ch. 3). But even if those 
mechanisms could do the required job, the problem is whether the representation 
of perspective differences does not already presuppose objective content to which 
both perspectives simultaneously refer. Furthermore, one might wonder whether 
a social account of content and thinking can really use TT, Simulation tools and 
Bratman’s analysis of joint action for understanding the sort of sharing or joint-
ness that underlies the very possibility of thinking. These tools are tailored to 
explain social cognition and joint action, respectively, but not to account for the 
emergence of objective content. Thus, it is not clear that ST, TT and Bratman’s 
account of joint action do not already use a notion of content that a social account 
7 At the core of Davidson’s view, for example, is the idea that these two capacities amount to the 
same one (e.g. Davidson 1992).
8 Echoing Davidson’s worry: But words, like thoughts, have a familiar meaning […] only if they 
occur in a rich context, […which] is required […for them to have] a meaningful function”. This 
rich context involves full-fledged propositional attitudes (Davidson 1997, p. 127).
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of objective content claims developed from the use of these very mechanisms. If 
this were so, it would amount to restating the essential tension under investiga-
tion here: presupposing the kind of content we need to explain.
As for collective intentionality, a related worry arises. The ability to adopt a 
we-perspective seems to fall short of the ability to entertain an objective point 
of view. The fact that I am able to adopt a we-perspective, i.e. the perspective 
of my group, does not by itself entail that I am adopting a view from nowhere. 
Tomasello claims that a member of the group can speak as a representative of 
the whole, and this seems fair, but even if a group’s point of view might suffice to 
distinguish in-group from out-group perspectives, it is not clear that this would 
imply the ability to adopt an objective point of view, independent of any particu-
lar perspective. And conversely, if the opposition between the in-group perspec-
tive and the out-group perspective is thought to be enough to imply that members 
of the group are able to entertain a universal point of view that allows them to 
compare such perspectives, why is it not the same with the contrast between two 
perspectives in the I-Thou case?9
In sum, Tomasello (1) provides an analysis of joint intentionality exclusively 
in terms of joint action that assumes Bratman’s view on jointness and comple-
ments it with a model that integrates ST and TT accounts of social cognition, and 
(2) gives an account of objective thinking based on forms of group thinking that 
amount progressively to a universal group or a perspective from no-where. Both 
(1) and (2) seem ill-equipped to give a naturalistic account of objective content, 
either falling short from what is required or presupposing what needs explaining. 
Thus, Tomasello’s two step strategy, though promising, falls short of providing 
a naturalistic account of objective content. To close, I would like to suggest that 
other forms of shared intentionality might provide us with an alternative under-
standing of we-intentionality fit for successfully accounting for objective content. 
I have already said that Tomasello sees the evolution of culture as the milestone 
of the human species. But what does it take to belong to a culture?
4  A Primitive Form of Collective Intentionality
I would like to briefly suggest a different way in which the intermediate step 
between chimps’ proto-propositional attitudes and full-fledged human inten-
tionality could be understood. I take this to be sympathetic with Tomasello’s 
9 Both Davidson 1992; Brandom 1994, ch. 8, Section VI, claim that these two cases are alike, 
both implying that an objective point of view is already implicit.
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strategy while avoiding some of the problems it raises. The proposed strategy 
would basically consist in portraying the form of intentionality that precedes 
and grounds what Tomasello calls ‘collective intentionality’ in terms of a more 
primitive but already collective form of intentionality. This form would not 
include the demanding apparatus that Tomasello, following Bratman, proposes 
in order to explain jointness, but would nevertheless be a form of social inten-
tionality that can be thought to underlie and support the development of the 
full-fledged kind that already involves conventions, language, institutions, and 
objective content.
Can there be a more primitive form of collective intentionality? We could 
hypothesize a more primitive kind of group behavior that is not preceded by joint 
intentionality but rather integrated with more primitive forms of joint action. This 
sort of group behavior would amount to special forms of group thinking, acting 
and feeling that are displayed in jointly acting and that do not require  singular 
representations of others’ mental states but that spring from common back-
ground rules, norms and habits.
What would the details of such an account look like? This question is par-
ticularly pressing, as the prospects of this view’s avoiding the essential tension 
that threatens social accounts of the emergence of content would depend on 
such details. Three elements would be part and parcel of the primitive form 
of the collective intentionality here outlined: (i) social conformism; (ii) forms 
of coordination that enable individuals to follow others and conform to group 
behavior; and (iii) social cognition that allows one to identify others’ approval 
or disapproval.
This strategy is inspired by Haugeland (1990), who gives one of the more 
developed expressions of neo-Pragmatism. He posits a mechanism for social con-
formism and compliance – a mechanism that oils the wheels of the kind of social 
engagement that makes objective thought possible:
when community members behave normally, how they behave is in general directly 
accountable to what is normal in their community; their dispositions have been inculcated 
and shaped according to those norms, and their behavior continues to be monitored for 
compliance. (Haugeland 1990, p. 406)10
10 Tomasello himself endorses the idea that social conformism is an important element in the 
development of objective thinking, though he posits it later, alongside what he calls ‘Collective 
Intentionality’. There is an ongoing debate (Sterelny 2012; Pacherie 2013, 2015) about whether a 
single mechanism – for social and cultural transmission – or a suite of different ones, boosted by 
feedback loops, lies at the heart of such developments. Whatever the outcome of this debate, no 
one doubts that a capacity for social conformism will form at least part of the best explanation of 
how human cognition did, and does, come into being. 
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These mechanisms of social conformity get the practice of learning and teach-
ing off the ground and do not require individuals to purposefully comply with 
rules from the get-go.11 Instead of representing rules and others’ assessments of 
their actions, individuals would be sensitive to others’ assessments through emo-
tional tuning to others’ approval and disapproval.12 A second key element to be 
included in this story is the individuals’ capacity for coordination that enables 
them to follow others and conform to group behavior.13 Finally, social cognition 
might play a key role in this picture as well, for example in explaining tuning 
to someone else’s approval and disapproval reactions but, instead of having 
recourse to TT and ST or a combination of the two, this strategy, following the 
phenomenological tradition, would align itself with the idea that at least some 
mental states are directly observable (see Merleau-Ponty 1964; Zahavi 2014). In 
the same vein, some studies in developmental psychology have provided evi-
dence that  face-to-face encounters involve direct perceptual understanding of 
others and intentionally directed responses to them that do not implicate infer-
ences or simulations (Reddy et  al. 2013). This approach has some interesting 
advantages in contrast to TT and ST models. It does not presuppose that a cogni-
tive gap needs to be bridged – by either simulations or theoretical inferences – for 
social understanding in its basic forms to emerge and allows one to explain very 
early forms of social interaction in babies as young as two months of age (Rochat 
and Striano 1999; Reddy 2008). If children are immersed in these social practices 
early on in development, it might be that the ability to adapt and integrate within 
groups and to adjust to the behavior of others in the group, including one-to-one 
interactions, is prior to the kind of joint intentionality that depends on represent-
ing and simulating the mental states of others.
As to the intermediate evolutionary step, Tomasello stresses that individu-
als at this point only gathered in special occasions and with particular others. 
This might pose a challenge to the alternative view, as if this were the case, no 
groups and thus no group norms would be in place to be followed and learned. 
However, the primitive form of collective intentionality here outlined is not 
meant to depend on already stable groups but to progressively contribute to their 
development. We might think that a few individuals behaving alike under the 
same circumstances and with similar needs might suffice to get the practice off 
the ground.
11 Teaching and learning norm-abiding behavior are to be understood as biologically inherited 
human capacities (see also Tomasello 1999; Racokzy et al. 2009; Csibra and Gergely 2009). 
12 I have developed this aspect of the proposal with more detail in Satne 2014.
13 See Pacherie 2013, 2015. This would involve an innate tendency to coordinate with others 
one’s bodily movements and, progressively, more sophisticated activities (Knoblich et al. 2011).
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Regarding the development of objective forms of thinking, one may hold that 
the capacity to act and think within groups expands with time, training and expo-
sure to foreign groups, beginning with perspective blindness and progressively 
moving to more explicit and universal, objective forms of thinking that involve 
the capacity to explicitly represent foreign perspectives and ultimately a perspec-
tive from nowhere. If this were so, there would be no need to represent I-Thou 
perspectives from the outset; quite the contrary, this capacity would  co-develop 
with the capacity to represent objective facts, i.e. to adopt a point of view from no-
where. Essential to this second step would be the development of language in the 
context of which objective content would have its proper place. If this is a sound 
alternative, it might well be that group identification and membership underlie 
and support the development of the capacity to represent other persons’ perspec-
tives (including joint intentionality as described by Tomasello and Bratman), and 
not the other way around.
While this is of course a rough sketch of an alternative, its only aim is to lay 
out a possible and appealing path to be further developed. Its main attraction is 
that it might amount, if substantially developed, to an account of social conform-
ism that dispenses with representations of others’ mental states and perspectives 
from the get-go. Introducing a primitive form of collective intentionality into the 
picture may then furnish the right tools to pursue a social account of the emer-
gence of objective content.
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